The cultivation of implicit knowledge as an essential part of expert development (2023)

a literary critique

Lisa Re Brooks Babin e
Alice J. (Sena) Garven

army university

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Summary

As the US military drives the future of military learning, it is important to better understand and cultivate not only the explicit acquisition of knowledge, but also the tacit knowledge needed to become an expert in any field (Army University, 2017). Understanding tacit knowledge and how it is transmitted throughout the force as a whole will increase the military's agility, adaptability, and speed of reaction to any challenge presented by adversaries. Achieving this requires creating metrics and developing assessments that measure the explicit and implicit knowledge that inform talent management, training, and deployment of all armed forces for future military operations.

introduction

I am going to reconsider human knowledge, starting from the fact that we can know more than we can say.

– Michael Polanyi,the silent dimension(1966b, S.4)

A compreensão dos componentes do conhecimento humano tem sido estudada e debatida há décadas, mas os estudiosos geralmente apoiam o uso de duas categorias de conhecimento: (1) conhecimento explícito e (2) conhecimento implícito (tácito) (Mohajan 2017; Purković, 2018). Além disso, há um interesse renovado da indústria e dos militares no estudo do conhecimento humano e da gestão do conhecimento para obter uma vantagem competitiva sobre os adversários (Department of Defense, 2018; Mohajan, 2017; Seidler-de Alwis & Hartmann, 2008).

The authors will first compare and contrast tacit and explicit knowledge to provide a solid foundation for the reader. The second section will emphasize the importance of tacit knowledge to enhance the Armed Forces' ability to remain competitive and resilient in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous situations. The third section discusses assessments designed to measure tacit knowledge in a military population. Finally, the article will conclude with a research-oriented way forward to assess tacit knowledge transfer in military education and training to enhance future military learning.

Explicit and implicit knowledge

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-01.1 defines implicit knowledge as

What do individuals know; a unique and personal wealth of knowledge from life experience, continuing education and networks of friends, acquaintances and colleagues. Includes learned nuances, subtleties, and workarounds. Intuition, mental agility, and crisis reactions are also forms of tacit knowledge. (US Department of the Army [DA], 2015a, pp. 1-3)

In contrast, ATP 6-01.1 says that

Explicit knowledge is codified or formally documented knowledge that is organized and transmitted to others by digital or non-digital means. Explicit knowledge has rules, boundaries, and precise meanings. Examples include computer files, dictionaries, textbooks, and Army and Commonwealth publications. (DA, 2015a, pp. 1-3)

The father of implicit knowledge, Michael Polanyi, (1966a) described implicit knowledge with an analogy to the bicycle. He stated that being able to ride a bike had nothing to do with reading about riding a bike (explicit knowledge), but rather finding the balance point and coordinating various muscles to successfully ride a bike without being aware of it (tacit knowledge). . 🇧🇷 Other examples of tacit knowledge include: playing sports (Gerrard & Lockett, 2018); baking bread (Nonaka, 1991); making music (Mládková, 2008); performance of medical procedures (Edmonson, Winslow, Bohmer & Pisano, 2003); and make leadership decisions (DA, 2015b). Indeed, many military activities, such as conducting engagements with key leaders and advising and assisting partners, rely heavily on the tacit acquisition of knowledge (Brown, 2018; Nash & Magistad, 2010).

As Polanyi (1966b) states in the epigraph, it is possible that there is knowledge that is difficult to convey in words, but how much of this tacit knowledge can be made explicit has not yet been determined in the literature. Learning is likely to be a continuum of knowledge acquisition and integration, making it difficult to completely separate the measurement of explicit and tacit knowledge. As noted by Seidler-de Alwis and Hartmann (2008): “Implicit and explicit knowledge are complementary, which means that both types of knowledge are essential for knowledge generation” (p. 134). Fortunately, philosophers, educators, and practitioners have spent decades evaluating how people learn and what kinds of knowledge are gained from different experiences. Furthermore, much is known about the factors that influence learning and tacit knowledge in particular.

From the literature, knowledge can be categorized into “strings and things” (Collins, 2010, p. 85) or represented as a continuum as mentioned above. If salient features of implicit and explicit knowledge can be identified, and the features are different, researchers can categorize and measure knowledge separately. Jasimuddin, Klein and Connell (2005) identified salient features of explicit and tacit knowledge. Specifically, explicit knowledge is categorized by information that is codified, easily articulated, communicated, and stored in media and other physical locations that are tangible, impersonal, and owned by an organization rather than a single person. The opposite of each are the factors related to tacit knowledge: uncodified; folks; difficult to articulate, communicate and memorize; resides exclusively in the individual's brain; acquired through personal exchanges, such as storytelling; and property of the organization and its members.

The problem with categorizing knowledge into two separate boxes is that you can miss the important overlap that exists when learning is truly a continuum. There's also the risk of forcing artificial categorization, where you misrepresent knowledge to make things look neat and tidy. On the other hand, categorization has the advantage of being a starting point, especially when it comes to learning how to improve knowledge acquisition.

Those who defend knowledge as a continuum support the view that “implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge are the poles of a spectrum of knowledge” (Jasimuddin et al., 2005, p. 104), but make it clear that overlap is important between to understand explicit and implicit knowledge. Chen, Snyman and Sewdass (2005) make it clear that "the spiral operating between tacit and explicit knowledge, constantly producing new knowledge in work groups, generates the energy and innovation that characterize an active, knowledge-intensive and knowledge-creating organization" ( p. .6). This finding underscores the importance of examining tacit knowledge to understand not only how military personnel learn, but also how new knowledge is created in a learning organization.

Focus on individual learning and the continuum from explicit to tacit knowledge and consider a soldier skill like shooting an M16 rifle. Per US Department of the Army (FM) Field Manual 3-22.9 (2008).M16/M4 Series Marksmanship Rifle Weapons, Soldiers begin their training by learning the “Fundamentals of Firearms, which are taught in four phases – Preliminary Firearms Practice, Range Feedback, Field Firearms, and Advanced Firearms Practice” (pgs. 1) -1).

In the first phase, soldiers receive a four-hour class, during which they learn the weapon's components, how to assemble and disassemble it, and how to clean it. They note the weight of the weapon (with/without a sling), operational characteristics and maximum effective range. The knowledge acquired in class is an explicit knowledge of shooting facts, but it does not make anyone a shooter, much less an expert.

Most of learning to be a marksman happens holding and shooting the gun. This is the development of implicit knowledge that is personal and intuitive. Phases 2, 3, and 4 emphasize the importance of practice, feedback, and adjustments in shooting behavior, as illustrated in Figure 1 (on page 7).

Soldiers practice grouping shots, firing from different distances and positions, while getting concrete feedback from holes left in targets and cues from trainers. Adjustments are made to posture, breathing, and trigger pressure, resulting in improved performance. “When solving basic problems, the only limiting factor is the trainer's imagination” (DA, 2008, pp. 5-14).

Depending on the soldier's unit, advanced training can include moving targets, firing ranges, varying terrain and weather conditions, and targets with friendly or enemy silhouettes. More explicit knowledge can be integrated with tacit knowledge by reading about advanced skills, receiving instruction from instructors in the classroom, and adding advanced tacit knowledge through practice in simulated and live environments.

Learning to be an expert starts with tangible, explicit knowledge of the weapon, but most learning comes from implicit knowledge of the field, feedback, and adjustments made as you shoot. In summary, as said by a soldier who consistently scored perfect marks on his qualifying exams:

To become an expert, the cycle of experimentation and feedback is important because it allows the soldier to take control of his own learning and thus achieve more than he thought possible, empowering and motivating him to do better. and until you hit 40 out of 40 goals. (First Class Specialist W.O. Gray, personal communication, September 26, 2018)

Figure 1 depicts knowledge development along a continuum from explicit to implicit, with learning being iterative and integrated. It is important to note that the amount of explicit and implicit knowledge needed to develop a skill can differ. In particular, Mohajan (2016) estimates that “approximately 90% of knowledge in any organization is tacitly embedded and synthesized” (p. 10). Much like our target practice example, only a small part of the knowledge needed to become a marksman comes from explicit knowledge gained through reading army manuals and classroom lessons. Most of the learning comes from acquiring tacit knowledge through practice, discussion, adjustment and refinement of shooting skills. So how can the army ensure that soldiers are given the right amount of explicit and implicit knowledge to become a gunner? How much more does it take to become a sniper or an expert? What are the influencing factors that promote or hinder learning? Can every soldier become an expert, or are there aspects of behavior that cannot be learned, as Polanyi (1966b) postulates?

The first step in answering these questions is recognizing the importance of assessing knowledge over time and identifying the requirements needed to determine when a person has become an expert. For marksmanship, the Army has done a great job of determining what it takes to become an expert (DA, 2008). Doctrine identified specific skills to measure and provided many recommendations for improving performance. Other skills in the army are less well defined. For example, hard skills like shooting differ from soft skills like consulting.

According to Brown (2018), “current US military doctrine identifies twenty-six personality traits that are desirable in advisors” (p. 1). Of the 26, he identified the five most important qualities from his personal experience as a consultant and trainer: empathetic, humble, visionary, diplomatic and confident. In addition, the Security Force Assistance Doctrine (DA, 2009) identifies additional individual and collective skills needed to be a good advisor. A selection of these skills presented in FM 3-07.1support from security forces, are: “communicating across cultures, building relationships, influencing and negotiating” (p. 7-4). These traits and abilities are very subtle and sophisticated. Furthermore, it is the combination of necessary attributes and skills that make the best consultants.

While Counseling is much more complex than Marksmanship, the Army has spent considerable time and effort identifying and training the knowledge, skills, and behaviors needed to be a good Counselor. But what about an expert advisor? According to Kauffman (2018), “Initial coverage by the SFAB [Security Force Assistance Brigade] suggests that the curriculum is still not comprehensive enough for our forces to operate successfully in the human sphere” (p. 89). It is clear that more needs to be done to understand, cultivate and transmit the tacit knowledge of the soft skills needed to succeed in a complex world.

Tacit knowledge and winning in a complex world

One of the main reasons for this curriculum and training gap is the growing complexity of the business environment. Army FM 3-0,The operation, states: “Army operations take place in the most complex environments, in lands between people who have fundamental differences of opinion” (DA, 2017a, pp. 1-4). Furthermore, as described by Schatz, Fautua, Stodd, and Reitz (2017), “globalization, ever-increasing computational power, and the proliferation of inexpensive advanced technologies have created an unprecedented level of global complexity” (p. 78). This increasing complexity makes military operations extremely difficult. To succeed in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment, military personnel must respond quickly and thoroughly to enemy actions (DA, 2017a). You need to learn fast and act like an expert with confidence. Once they have developed their job-related skills beyond the explicit to the implicit, they can respond quickly and effectively to any challenge presented to them, but soldiers must be sure they are acquiring this implicit knowledge.

At the organizational level, when militaries are able to recognize and leverage tacit knowledge across the enterprise, they can more quickly and efficiently deploy talent. If processes are in place and assessments are done, understanding how to accelerate the tacit transfer of knowledge can lead to better training for future, as-yet-unknown skills. In particular, Durant-Law (2003) states that when a company becomes a learning organization, it is able to capture and explain the implicit knowledge of its workforce. By employing mechanisms that encourage employees to codify and share their tacit knowledge, organizations “act at a higher level that allows them to predict outcomes, adapt to changing circumstances, and most importantly, innovate” (Durant-Law, 2003, p 1).

In many ways, the military is already doing this. After-action reviews are a great example of coding and sharing information about what worked and what didn't after a mission. "Right Seat Rides" are formal activities that units use to transfer tacit knowledge from a unit on the ground to the unit that will replace them on the ground. Additionally, Soldiers can develop continuity books to explain and share the tacit knowledge they gained during their deployment with those they replace to allow for a smoother transition of roles and responsibilities. Unfortunately, if these and other methods are not used effectively, there is a great loss of institutional knowledge that cannot be easily recovered (Şensoy, Keskin & Orhan, 2015).

There are also many factors that affect learning in general that make the path to becoming an expert more challenging. The literature identifies numerous factors that influence learning, especially when it comes to adult learning.The US Army Graduate Learning Concept: 2020-2040specifies six basic principles of adult education: “the learner's need to know; learner's self-concept; learner's previous experience; desire to learn; learning orientation; and motivation to learn” (DA, 2017b, p. 26).

With explicit information such as memorizing the characteristics of an M16, the soldier's need for knowledge, previous experience, willingness to learn and motivation to learn will affect his performance in the first few hours of artillery training. These factors also affect the development of tacit knowledge. The soldier must be motivated to practice target shooting behavior, have a strong sense of his body's identity to know proper posture, breathing pattern, and trigger feel, and be able to draw on past experience to effectively aim at targets. a target to shoot.

Referring specifically to tacit knowledge, the feedback given when learning a skill is an important factor in the effective acquisition of tacit knowledge, since this learning is experiential and personal. Feedback should be consistent, clear, and relevant to the learner. Effective feedback helps the learner know what “right” feels like. Feedback also needs to be immediate so that the student can assess why their behavior is hurting their performance and make adjustments as needed. The longer the delay between actions and feedback, the greater the probability that the student will not be able to correct and thus improve their performance. That oneUS Army Learning Conceptemphasizes the importance of providing feedback to students, involving them in the process of analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation for the development of learning products to facilitate adult learning (DA, 2017b). In addition, theArmy Learning Strategynotes that Army leaders must provide meaningful feedback and consider delivery mechanisms that are “skillfully designed and properly delivered” (Army University, 2017, p. 12).

Another area of ​​research that has focused on the factors that influence knowledge acquisition is comparing the performance of novices and experts. A key difference between a novice and an expert is how they approach a problem. A beginner has little experience to rely on, so must methodically and explicitly solve a problem, and may have trouble with what to focus on and what to ignore. An expert has knowledge and experience that can be applied to a problem, looking at it more abstractly to see the big picture and not be distracted by irrelevant information (Hinds, Patterson & Pfeffer, 2001).

Charness, Krampe, Reingold, Tuffash, and Vasyukova (2005) showed that the most important factor in predicting expert versus novice chess performance was intentional practice. Players must “spend thousands of hours of focused analysis and memorization of chess tactics and positions to build the knowledge base needed to consistently succeed in highly competitive chess tournaments” (Charness et al., 2005, p. 163). The authors also point out that experienced chess players need to self-regulate during a tournament. This includes effective time management, avoiding distractions, and controlling negative emotions. From this research, explicit and tacit knowledge working together results in expert performance. It also highlights the importance of repetition (physical and mental) and the emotional factors that can affect performance.

Confidence to repeat successes and bounce back from failures is also important for reaching expert level, especially on difficult tasks. Unfortunately, when a person doesn't take the time to consider the physical and emotional factors at play and lose focus, overconfidence can have the opposite effect. Finally, repetition reduces the learning decay that can occur with ephemeral skills such as sharpshooting.

Measure explicit and implicit knowledge

Having defined and described tacit knowledge and presented the factors that influence military learning, the main question that needs to be answered in this article, especially for the combatant, is "How to measure explicit and tacit knowledge?"

Explicit knowledge assessment is well known. These are the tools used in traditional classroom settings to assess student learning or on promotion panels to assess a soldier's understanding of facts relevant to his job. These assessments range from basic true or false statements to more complex scenario assessments where written and oral exams easily teach you how to do something and are easily graded using rubrics.

Efforts to measure explicit knowledge are supported in part by the Army's adoption of Bloom's taxonomy and six cognitive levels (DA, 2013). The original taxonomy was revised in 1956 and currently identifies the six cognitive dimensions as remembering, understanding, applying, analyzing, evaluating, and creating (Krathwohl, 2002). The first phase assesses a person's ability to memorize facts and recall information. The next level concerns a person's ability to explain information and not just regurgitate facts. The third level involves applying information in new and unique ways. This level seems to represent the intersection between explicit and tacit knowledge, applying known facts, which may have been acquired through explicit learning processes, to different situations or problems based on previous experiences. The fourth level involves the ability to compare and contrast situations or related issues to develop a deeper understanding and thereby facilitate the next level of decision making through assessment. The sixth and final level is "create". It is here that "new knowledge" is produced. Krathwohl (2002) defines the creative level as “assembling elements into a new and coherent whole or an original product” (p. 215).

Using the stages of Bloom's taxonomy, the gunshot analogy can be further analyzed as an example of stages of learning and the associated development of tacit knowledge (see Figure 2). The first level, “Remember”, allows the soldier to memorize the components of an M16, its weight and the maximum effective ranges when firing. At the next level, the soldier demonstrates "understanding" by explaining how the weapon is built, how to adjust the scope, and what factors affect hitting the target. In terms of 'application', the third level, the soldier must demonstrate how his understanding of weapon mechanics actually results in effective shooting. That is, he must physically apply explicit knowledge and develop his implicit knowledge through practice to qualify for the shooting range. As soldiers are challenged to improve their shooting skills at a higher level of analysis, they will experience shooting in different situations, different positions, and possibly with different weapons. This exercise helps Soldiers develop their individual shooting behavior more deeply (eg, breathing, trigger pressure, eye release), expanding their tacit knowledge through practice. Unfortunately, practice alone is not enough to become a pro. At the next level, 'assessment', the individual must review and critique their behavior (hopefully with the support of an experienced trainer who provides actionable feedback). Without quality feedback, continued practice can actually lead to the development of bad habits that make one less likely to become a professional shooter. With the support of an expert and qualified instructor/mentor, who provides information and feedback to the soldier, they “create” together new knowledge about how that person can become a skilled marksman. This new knowledge can then be shared with others within the organization to help novices become experts.

By categorizing tacit knowledge into levels of Bloom's taxonomy, a method for measuring tacit knowledge is also provided. That is, when a soldier's shooting skills are at the creation level, where he creates new knowledge through the development of improved techniques and procedures, they are known to have maximized the acquisition of tacit knowledge. On the other hand, at the level of application and evaluation, the soldier shoots well, but has not yet acquired new knowledge that will lead him to a perfect shooting performance in all combat situations.

Another approach to measuring tacit knowledge was developed by Robert Sternberg and colleagues (Antonakis, Hedlund, Pretz, and Sternberg, 2002; Cianciolo, Anotonakis, and Sternberg, 2001; Hedlund, Antonakis, and Sternberg, 2002; Hedlund et al., 1998; Horvath et al. al., 1994a, 1994b; Matthew, Cianciolo & Sternberg, 2005; Sternberg et al., 1999). Unlike most other surveys that assess tacit knowledge, this effort focused specifically on the military population. For this reason, the authors will present the team's findings as a possible way to measure military learning.

Sternberg and his team based their efforts on Sternberg's triarchic theory of intelligence, particularly in relation to his research on practical intelligence. This was a valid approach, since practical intelligence involves implicit knowledge (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Early in the research effort, Horvath et al. (1994b) performed a comprehensive review of the literature on tacit knowledge and military leadership. They divided tacit knowledge into three categories: (1) intrapersonal, (2) interpersonal, and (3) organizational. Intrapersonal tacit knowledge consists of information about oneself - specifically, about a person's self-awareness, self-motivation and self-organization. The interpersonal domain focuses on knowing about other people's behaviors. This includes a person's ability to influence, collaborate with, and understand others. The organizational domain consists of behaviors related to the organization. The authors focused on how organizations optimize their workforce, how they define the organization, and the extent to which the organization has a vision for the future. The authors recognized that the categories are not mutually exclusive, but in creating the framework they felt confident that implicit knowledge could be measured and used to predict job performance.

Horvath, and others. (1994a) continued the research by developing a tacit knowledge instrument to measure tacit knowledge in military leaders. The authors conducted semi-structured interviews with 81 active-duty Army officers from Combat Weapons, Combat Support, and Combat Support Units. The interview data were coded and classified according to different examples of tacit knowledge used by army leaders to deal with complex problems. Their findings indicated that these milestones for train drivers included self-management and establishing credibility with others. For company commanders, these milestones included balancing interests at the company and battalion levels. For battalion commanders, these milestones included managing organizational change and communication (Horvath et al., 1994b, p. vii).

The results provided the raw data used by the follow-up survey to better assess how tacit knowledge can be measured with military personnel. Horvath, and others. (1996) used the previous results with additional research data to create an implicit knowledge model. In addition, several research products by Horvath et al. developed. (1998) for use in research team work and others from 1998 to 2008. They showed that the tacit knowledge of officers and non-commissioned officers was measured using sophisticated scenario tools and with other measures of leadership effectiveness, knowledge, and organizational culture ( Taylor, Higley, & Grabarczyk, 2008).

Most relevant to this article is the process used to develop valid measures of tacit knowledge among military personnel. The first step was to conduct interviews with a sample of the target population to extract stories and insights from work-related experiences. Horvath, and others. (1994a) included a sample interview protocol. The next step would be a content analysis of the raw data to identify examples of implicit knowledge that can be classified to create a category structure. Horvath, and others. (1996) provided an example of several categories of tacit knowledge items, such as: 'dealing with poor performance', 'building trust' and 'self-management' (p. 18). Categories were used to create preliminary inventories. The inventories contained scenario-based questions in which participants ranked possible responses from "extremely bad" to "extremely good" based on what they would do in that situation. Hedlund et al. (1998) used the scenario: “You are a company commander with some relatively young lieutenants. Your goal is to develop these lieutenants. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal” (p. B-18). Examples of choices were: "involving sub-lieutenants in all administrative activities of the company"; "Involve lieutenants only in decisions that affect their platoons"; and "Tell the lieutenants if something in the battalion is bothering you" (p. B-18). Participants' experiences and other demographic information were also collected to determine their level of work experience.

Additionally, subject matter experts were used to determine "expert" responses. This is usually done using survey data, where experts are asked to rank items on various dimensions. The results can be used to identify which items discriminate between experienced and inexperienced responses. Finally, the results informed the final set of tacit knowledge measures used for follow-up surveys.

This process can be duplicated with a focus on any military learning environment to assess the explicit and implicit knowledge acquired. In addition, research could determine the balance between explicit and tacit knowledge needed to become an expert in certain military specialties. For example, to become a successful consultant, how much explicit knowledge is required before participating in training at a combat training center where tacit knowledge needs to be refined prior to deployment? Finally, by understanding the explicit and tacit knowledge needed to become an expert in a given skill, soldiers could create new education and training programs that accelerate knowledge transfer and make it more agile to meet future combat needs.

future research

Other methods of measuring knowledge transfer exist in the literature, but they focus on non-military populations. Future research should consider this literature and incorporate the methods, especially if they provide less complex but scientifically sound processes. Interestingly, the recommendations by Schatz, et al. (2017) align closely with other methods of measuring tacit knowledge about performance measurements, competency models, maintaining robust data management systems, and collaborative learning approaches.

There are numerous performance measures and competency models that can inform different methods of measuring tacit knowledge (MacLean, Kerr, & Qaseem, 2018; Russo, 2016; Stecher & Hamilton, 2014). There is also a growing body of literature exploring better ways of managing knowledge (Barley, Treem & Kuhn, 2017; Chen et al., 2005). In addition, there are several formal and informal approaches to collaborative learning that soldiers can adopt or refine to further develop tacit knowledge. Some examples would be the use of learning stories, whispered lectures, sketch notes, smartphone apps, game-based learning, mechanisms for remote team building, strategies to enhance productive speech, etc. Anything that might help explain the tacit transfer of knowledge from one person to another over time would benefit military readiness.

Of course, military learning involves both explicit and tacit knowledge that can be known, measured, and shared to some extent within an organization. Furthermore, effectively managing this knowledge in an organization facilitates the improvement of institutional effectiveness, innovation and resilience (Mohajan, 2016, 2017).

In short, the US military has many of the elements it needs to successfully identify, measure, and transfer tacit knowledge throughout its organization, but more needs to be done. Extracted from Schatz, et al. (2017): “The time is right to unleash the full potential of our human dimension. All the resources are there – science, technology and demand – and all we need is a common strategy and the will to pursue it” (p. 89).

After extensively discussing tacit knowledge and arguing that measurement is indeed possible, the authors wish to propose some research questions for future study based on the hypothesis that identifying ways to accelerate the acquisition of tacit knowledge can improve army readiness.

1. Does increased acquisition of explicit knowledge before training and/or educational events promote the development of tacit knowledge? So the performance ramps down?

2. How do motivation, self-confidence and self-reflection affect the acquisition of implicit knowledge?

3. What opportunities exist to codify tacit knowledge into Army tactics, techniques, and procedures and lessons learned that result in enterprise-grade best practices that can be effectively managed and efficiently transferred throughout the organization?

4. How effective are collaborative learning techniques in increasing the implicit transfer of knowledge from experts to learners? Can these techniques improve feedback from spotters, trainers, and coaches to students in training centers?

5. Can simulations enhance the development of tacit knowledge or are there limitations to the tacit knowledge obtained from them? How important is simulation accuracy?

6. At what point in education and training does practice reach its peak of effectiveness and when does advancing in the development of tacit knowledge require real experience? 🇧🇷

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Lisa Re Brooks Babin, PhD,is a research psychologist in the Institutional Evaluation and Research Division of the Office of the Dean of the Army University. She received her PhD in Learning and Comparative Experimental Psychology from the University of Montana and, in her current role, researches the needs of Army training and education leaders.

Alice J. (Sena) Garven, PhD,is head of the Division of Research and Institutional Evaluation at the University of the Army. Previously, she worked at the Army Research Institute for 13 years. She received her PhD in Social Psychology from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and has been an Army researcher for over 15 years.

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